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Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
Lisa Harriman Randall
Corruption can change the course of a nation's politics and
alter the standard of living it affords to its citizens. The rela-
tionship between the public and private sectors is rendered less
beneficial to both sides when corrupted by the practice of brib-
ery. The United States expresses its disapproval of this practice
in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which forbids
American companies from engaging in bribery even when oper-
ating outside the borders of this country. However, there is vig-
orous debate over whether this law is the best means of giving
effect to our national stand against the advance of corruption.
Recent years have seen increasing global interest in imple-
menting antibribery measures. Developed countries are becom-
ing more willing to limit their companies' freedom to give bribes
to corrupt foreign officials. Conversely, developing countries are
becoming more anxious to eliminate avenues through which cor-
rupt officials collect bribes. The United States favors this trend.
It has been working since the enactment of the FCPA to per-
suade other industrialized nations to follow its lead in outlawing
bribery; however, the indigenous enthusiasm for antibribery ini-
tiatives shown by historically corrupt countries presents an un-
precedented opportunity for the U.S. to broaden the effect of
FCPA policies.
This Note will examine the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and suggest a shift in the methods the United States uses to
encourage the rest of the world to adopt the law's policies. Sec-
tion I describes the circumstances that led to the enactment of
the FCPA, and introduces general concepts that illustrate the
motivation for national policies against this practice. Section II
outlines the specific provisions of the FCPA and analyzes the de-
bate between the law's supporters and its detractors. Section III
reviews past and present attempts to spread the policies embod-
ied in the FCPA beyond the United States. This Note concludes
that these policies may be more effectively advanced by backing
corrupt countries' own attempts to eliminate bribery than by
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continuing to pressure other industrialized nations to enact
their own versions of the FCPA.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
The Watergate affair of the 1970s was one of the most influ-
ential events in United States politics. It focused Americans' at-
tention on the importance of elected officials' integrity and
stamped certain individuals with permanent notoriety. In addi-
tion to the impact it had on American politics, the Watergate
investigation brought to light a significant economic policy issue.
Investigators started out looking for corporate slush funds,' sus-
pecting that these funds were the source of illegal campaign con-
tributions, but found more than they were expecting: many of
these secret funds also paid for bribes 2 to foreign officials.
Aside from bribery's general distastefulness, it has several
ramifications that make it a matter of concern. Public knowl-
edge of the practice destabilizes friendly governments. In the
1970s, citizens of Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy were
shocked to discover that their public officials had accepted bribes
from American companies, creating domestic political tumult
1. Mark J. Murphy, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair
Trade Practice?, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 385, 392 (1995).
Corporate "slush funds," uncovered during the Watergate investiga-
tions, consisted of off-the-record corporate accounts that would be used
to make questionable domestic and foreign payments in order to win
influence or business. Although the initial thrust of the investigation
focused on illegal campaign contributions, it soon became apparent
that many corporations involved in questionable behavior domestically
were also practicing similar acts overseas.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2. As used in this Note, "bribe" refers to a payment by a corporation domi-
ciled in one country to a government official in another country, made for the
purpose of influencing the official's judgment. An example of such a bribe is
when a company bidding to be the contractor on a government construction pro-
ject pays the official in charge of awarding that contract to select the company's
bid even though it is not the best bid offered. In this context, a "bribe" does not
include payments to other corporations or private individuals, however unethi-
cal, nor does it include "grease payments"--disbursements that encourage a
government employee to do what he or she is already obligated to do. See dis-
cussion infra note 40 and accompanying text. Interestingly, according to one
report, officials in different regions of the world seem to prefer different vari-
eties of bribes: in Africa, a yacht, a sports car, or a lucrative job for a relative of
the official; in Latin America, a weekend vacation, entertainment involving wo-
men, art, or jewelry for the official's wife; in Asia, a bet on a golf or poker game
rigged for the official to win. Christopher Byron, Big Profits in Big Bribery,
TIME, Mar. 16, 1981, at 59.
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and disrupting diplomatic relations with other countries.3 A
second negative consequence of bribery is economic inefficiency.
A corrupt bidding process means the company that wins the bid
is not necessarily the one that can produce the best product the
fastest and for the least money, but the one willing to bribe the
bid-taker. 4 It also means that a corrupt bid-taker will prioritize
government projects based on their relative potential to yield
bribe money, rather than on public need.5 Since a company that
wins a contract through bribery is not necessarily the lowest bid-
der, public prices affected by the corrupt contract will be higher
than they need be.6 Finally, it is difficult for the public to have
confidence in a free-market economy infected by corruption. 7
Bribery is bad business for the corporation practicing it.
Companies that bribe expose themselves to the dangers inher-
ent in the instability of their host countries' political regimes: a
company may cultivate illicit connections with a foreign govern-
3. Tamara Adler, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977: A Step Toward Clarification and Consolidation, 73 J. CiuM. L. & CRImi-
NOLOGY 1740, 1745 (1982). Disclosure of bribes "has allegedly precipitated 'the
removal of a Central American president, embarrassed a Philippine regime, led
to a constitutional crisis in the Netherlands, caused legislative paralysis in Ja-
pan, and shaken an Italian government.'" John W. Duncan, Comment, Modify-
ing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Search for a Practical Standard, 4
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203, 203 (1982) (quoting Gerald T. McLaughlin, The
Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments by Corporations: A Compar-
ative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1071, 1072 (1978)). See also
Robert S. Levy, Note, The Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Prac.
tices Act of 1977: Are They Really as Valuable as We Think They Are?, 10 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 71, 75 (1985); Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 205 (1994).
4. See Pines, supra note 3, at 213. "Bribery sabotages the free market
system at the core of capitalism; the best product at the best price does not
win." Id. See also Murphy, supra note 1, at 393. "[Bribery went against the
basic tenet of the free market system, namely, that the sale of products should
take place solely on the basis of price, quality, and service." Id.
5. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 390-91, where the author explains that
[b]ribery creates the potential for widespread economic damage be-
cause it misallocates money that could otherwise be spent on worth-
while national needs. Examples of the waste that bribery encourages
can be seen throughout corruption plagued Italy. A Business Week ar-
ticle describes, "highway overpasses... built on towering concrete pil-
lars-even though the surrounding land is flat" and the existence of
"superhighways to nowhere that begin and end abruptly."
Id.
6. Id. "Bribery and corruption inflate the cost of goods." Id.
7. Veronica Ann Deberardine, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Cre-
ating an Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 203, 222(1984). An economist asks rhetorically, "[how do you develop if you can't open
a fruit stand without paying a bribe?" Andrew W. Singer, Ethics: Are Stan.
dards Lower Overseas?, ACROSS THE BOARD, Sept. 1991, at 34.
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ment, only to become unwelcome when that government falls
from power and its allies become suspect." Bribery is also detri-
mental to American businesses as a group, in that when some
engage in it, the reputations and credibility of all suffer.9
At the time of the Watergate investigations, there was no
law specifically forbidding foreign bribery.10 Corporations were
required to disclose all questionable payments to foreign officials
in the financial statements they filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), and could be prosecuted for failing to
do so. This provided an indirect means of discouraging the prac-
tice of giving bribes.11 Apparently, though, corporate compunc-
tions about violating disclosure laws were mild. The SEC,
following Watergate investigators' tips, uncovered hundreds of
cases in which companies had not reported slush fund payments
they had made to government agents abroad.1 2
One of the most prominent SEC investigations in this early
stage was that of United Brands, which paid the president of
Honduras $1.25 million to exempt it from the country's prohibi-
8. See David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to Interna-
tional Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 182
(1995). The author comments:
It is worth keeping in mind that foreign bribery, even if not illegal
under the FCPA, still constitutes a substantial business risk for the
companies or individuals involved. The same may be true of some
charitable donations as well. Foreign governments change, and a pay-
ment that is unlawful in the foreign country and disclosed by a subse-
quent administration may cause significant problems, including
criminal prosecution or incarceration without prosecution.
Id.
9. See Deberardine, supra note 7, at 222. "[Blribery supports fears that
American businesses operating abroad will have a corrupting influence on the
host country's political systems." Id.
10. Id. at 221.
11. Levy, supra note 3, at 73. Issuers of publicly traded securities are re-
quired to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC. Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (1994).
12. Pines, supra note 3, at 188. The author explains that
[t~he fact that over 300 companies engaged in such transactions was
discovered only through voluntary disclosure. This indicates the inabil-
ity of indirect means to combat the problem. The position of the SEC,
and the use of the Bank Secrecy laws, required disclosure of bribes, but
did not actually forbid the use of bribery itself. Meanwhile, the Mail
Fraud Act was restrictive in that it only applied to bribes that used
U.S. mail or wire communications. The loopholes in these indirect
methods not only prevented prosecutions, but also failed to send the
desired message that bribery of foreign officials was wrong.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tive export tax on bananas. 13 The episode, predictably labeled
Bananagate, attracted particular attention because it followed
the suicide of the company's chief executive officer 14 and pre-
ceded a coup deposing the Honduran president.' 5 United
Brands, however, was not alone in experiencing some degree of
shame connected to foreign bribery; the list of companies found
to have so acted is a long one.' 6
Because of the magnitude of the SEC's investigatory
caseload, the agency added a program of voluntary disclosure to
its regular disclosure enforcement efforts. 17 Corporations that
suspected they might come under SEC scrutiny could gain a
measure of immunity from prosecution by admitting and rectify-
ing improper behavior they had not previously disclosed.' 8 To
qualify for this deferential treatment, a corporation was first re-
13. Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 Oino ST. L.J.
655, 664 (1984). United Brands is now known as Chiquita Brands Interna-
tional, Inc.
14. Id.
15. Murphy, supra note 1, at 391.
16. Mathews, supra note 13, at 664 (describing the "incredible saga of
Lockheed Corporation and its worldwide efforts to bribe senior ministers of
friendly foreign governments . .. Gulf in South Korea, Exxon in Italy, and
Northrop and Grumman in the Middle East"). Levy states that
[iun the course of its investigation of questionable expenditures made
by multinational corporations, the U.S. Subcommittee on Multina-
tional Corporations revealed the payment of an estimated $50 million
by Exxon Corporation to Italian officials. Approximately $5.5 million
was paid by Gulf Oil to other foreign officials. While under investiga-
tion, Northrop Corporation disclosed to the Subcommittee that it dis-
tributed $450,000 to several Saudi Arabian generals, $15,000 to an
Indonesian politician, and $4500 to an Iranian government official. In
addition, Northrop allegedly established a $30 million slush fund for
payments to foreign governmental authorities.
Levy, supra note 3, at 72.
17. Mathews, supra note 13, at 667. "As the scope of the payments problem
became apparent, extending to foreign as well as domestic payments, the SEC
realized that it did not have the resources to investigate each case carefully."
Id. See also Deberardine, supra note 7, at 221. "In addition [to its ability to
bring suits for failure to disclose corrupt payments], the SEC initiated a 'Volun-
tary Disclosure Program' to encourage corporations to report payments." Id.
18. Pines, supra note 3, at 187. "(T]he SEC indicated that it would likely
refrain from taking enforcement action against U.S. companies that immedi-
ately disclosed having made any such questionable payments." Id. See also
Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Administrative,
Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies-Their Influence on Corpo-
rate Internal Affairs, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 221 (1982) ("Although partic-
ipation in the voluntary program does not insulate a company from Commission
enforcement action, it does diminish the possibility that the Commission will, in
its discretion, institute an action.") (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 15,570,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,959, at 8 n.7 (Feb. 15,
1979)).
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quired to stop making questionable foreign payments and insti-
tute unimpeachable accounting procedures-steps designed to
prevent ongoing bribery. 19 Next, a participating corporation
was to designate an independent special counsel to investigate
the matter and make a report to the corporation's board of direc-
tors.20 The special counsel's findings would then be released to
the public in an 8-K filing.21 The corporation was also required
to give consent for the SEC to use the disclosed information as
the agency saw fit.2 2 For a corporation that had made bribe pay-
ments, the alternative was to risk subjecting itself to a formal
SEC enforcement action.23 Voluntary disclosure was preferable
19. Mathews, supra note 13, at 668. The author explains the program as
follows:
First, a corporation's board of directors should declare an end to all
payments of doubtful legality and practices involving maintenance of
inaccurate books and records. Second, the board should authorize a
special committee composed primarily of independent directors to per-
form a thorough investigation of the corporation's practices, using in-
dependent counsel and auditors to prepare a report for the full board.
Third, information on the commencement and progress of the investi-
gation should be lodged with the SEC on its Form 8-K, and a copy of
the final report should be filed with the SEC. Fourth, "[it must be
understood that the staff of the Commission will have access to any
information that is discovered or developed during the investigation"
Id.
20. Id.
21. An 8-K filing is one in which a company subject to SEC reporting re-
quirements-which applies to all companies whose stock is publicly traded-
discloses the details of a significant corporate event. The 8-K is commonly used
to report changes in control of the business as well as other significant corpo-
rate events. Form 8-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 31.002-31.003, at 21.991-
95 (Nov. 13, 1996).
22. Mathews, supra note 13, at 668.
23. Adler, supra note 3, at 1743. The author adds that
[iln the majority of cases, the corporations consented to the entry of a
judgment of permanent injunction without admitting or denying the
allegations of the complaint. The consent decrees usually ordered the
corporation not to make any future payments that would violate the
federal securities laws. In addition, the corporation agreed to establish
a special review committee to examine the payments made, analyze
the corporation's accounting procedures, and make recommendations
to its board of directors.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In addition to the companies discussed in supra note 7
and accompanying text, the SEC brought enforcement actions against Ashland
Oil, Phillips Petroleum, Braniff Airways, General Tire & Rubber, Boeing, Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph, General Refractories, Page Airways, Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber, General Telephone & Electronics, Textron, and
International Systems and Controls. Mathews, supra note 13, at 664-65.
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to a formal action because it was less public and more subject to
the corporation's control.24
The voluntary disclosure program was popular because it
met the needs of both the SEC and the companies suspected of
foreign bribery. The SEC was able to make sure shareholders
knew about the disguised funds, and participants in the volun-
tary program were able to avoid liability and minimize publicity.
The program's success manifested itself in a huge number of vol-
untary disclosures: approximately 450 companies admitted hav-
ing made a total of more than $300 million in bribes. 25 It was
24. See Mathews, supra note 13, at 666. The author summarizes the posi-
tion of companies suspected of bribery as follows:
By employing a self-investigation procedure, a company could use in-
side or outside counsel, not necessarily wholly independent, and at
least not subject to prior approval of the SEC or the court. It was
thought that by putting the corporate house in order in advance of an
SEC enforcement attack or during the pendency of an SEC enforce-
ment investigation, a company should be able to negotiate a milder
settlement when the SEC did strike in a formal enforcement action
and thus, be able to achieve an internal investigation less painful and
perhaps more private than the special counsel investigations man-
dated by a rigid SEC consent decree.
Id.
25. Commentators estimate 300 to 500 companies made voluntary disclo-
sures, disclosing a total of about $300 million in bribes. See, e.g., Murphy,
supra note 1, at 392; Adler, supra note 3, at 1744-45; Pines, supra note 3, at
187. Enforcement actions and voluntary disclosures required corporations to
reveal their bribery to the public. Adler summarizes some of the more notable
incidents as follows:
Bell Helicopter, a subsidiary of Textron, Inc., reported kicking back
$297,000 to an official in Ghana to facilitate an aircraft sale in that
country. A $2.9 million payment by Bell in connection with the sale of
helicopters to Iran was also reported. In addition, Gulf Oil Corporation
reported spending $10.3 million on gifts, entertainment and other
items related to political activity in the United States and abroad, in-
cluding $4 million given to the political party of the late South Korean
President Park Chung Hee. General Tire and Rubber Company dis-
closed that its affiliates paid $18,600 to a Venezuelan government offi-
cial to obtain confidential tax returns of competitors. General Tire also
gave $500,000 to Mexican purchasing agents to escape taxes and paid
6 million in "consultants' fees" and $4.4 million in "commissions in
Algeria to win contracts and ensure the cooperation of customs offi-
cials. Exxon Corporation acknowledged paying $1.2 million in 15 for-
eign countries "to secure or influence government action." Exxon's
Italian subsidiary made unauthorized commercial payments and polit-
ical contributions totalling $19 million. Also, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation reported improper payments to a foreign business agent in
Manila in order to obtain a major share of Philippine nuclear plant
construction contracts.
Adler, supra note 3, at 1744 (citing Don Holt & John Wolcott, The Missing
Memo, NEwswEzK, May 22, 1978, at 22; The Philippines: Tales from Disney.
land, TiME, Jan. 23, 1978, at 56).
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not, however, flawless. Independent counsel could not always
cause the subject corporations to disclose their illegal payments,
and some confidential information became available to the pub-
lic because of the SEC's obligations under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.2 6
II. PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR BUSINESSES
The imperfections in the voluntary disclosure program,27
along with Congressional outrage at the number and size of
bribes that corporations disclosed, 28 prompted the drafting and
passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).29 Con-
gress' general intent in enacting the FCPA was "to bring these
corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the
integrity of the American business system."30 Its strategy was
to cut off the supply of bribes flowing from American businesses
to corrupt foreign officials. One commentator opines that "no
statute since the 1933 and 1934 Acts themselves has done more
to effect corporate accountability by public companies than the
FCPA."31
26. Adler, supra note 3, at 1743-44.
27. Id.
28. See Deberardine, supra note 7, at 220. The FCPA "represents Con-
gress' response to the discovery that American corporations were engaged in
widespread bribery of foreign officials to secure business abroad." Id. (footnotes
omitted). See also Gantz, supra note 8, at 177 ("Congress enacted the [FCPA]
... in a spirit of moral outrage .. ").
29. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff(1996) [hereinafter FCPA]. The FCPA was signed into law by Pres-
ident Carter on December 19, 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, § 101, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977). See also Adler, supra note 3, at 1746 (describing motivation for
passage of FCPA).
30. Levy, supra note 3, at 71. Adler goes into more detail, identifying what
she believes to be
five distinct policy objectives. First, Congress believed that the pay-
ment of bribes was counter to the moral expectations and values of the
American public. Second, Congress was concerned over the public
scandals engendered by bribery and the resulting foreign policy
problems for the United States when friendly governments were em-
barrassed. Third, Congress wanted to prevent the distortion of com-
mercial competition caused by bribery. Fourth, Congress wished to
prevent the spread of corruption in friendly governments. Fifth, Con-
gress sought to minimize foreign mistrust of American business and to
improve the American reputation for honesty in business dealings.
Adler, supra note 3, at 1745. These objectives correspond closely with the nega-
tive effects of bribery discussed in supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
31. Mathews, supra note 13, at 670.
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The FCPA amends the Securities and Exchange Act, and
contains mandates governing both accounting practices and
bribery.3 2 It governs all "domestic concerns."38 The United
States was then, and is still, the only country in the world with
such a law.3 4 In fact, it is more common for governments to
sanction bribery of officials outside their borders by allowing tax
deductions for corrupt payments than to discourage foreign
bribery.35
The accounting provisions of the FCPA require that compa-
nies maintain their financial records "in reasonable detail," and
institute accounting practices that furnish "reasonable assur-
ances" that corporate assets are being handled responsibly and
32. FCPA §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (bribery), 78m(b) (accounting).
33. FCPA § 78dd-2(a). The statute defines "domestic concern" as
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States; and(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which
is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a terri-
tory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1). A separate section of the statute, § 78dd-1, contains almost
identical provisions addressing securities issuers, but the definition of "domes-
tic concerns" incorporates nearly all issuers, so they need not be discussed sepa-
rately. An important but often-overlooked point is that "[a]ll companies,
whether or not they conduct business overseas," are subject to the FCPA.
Duncan, supra note 3, at 206.
34. Pines, supra note 3, at 186; Murphy, supra note 1, at 386. "The United
States is unique among major trading nations in outlawing as 'corrupt' under
U.S. law the bribery of foreign government officials to obtain benefits." Gantz,
supra note 8, at 16. See also Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime in Russia: Impli-
cations for U.S. and International Law, 19 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1999, 2019
(1996). Daniel Pines clarifies this point by noting that "almost every country
forbids the bribery of its own officials, but only the United States through the
FCPA forbids the bribery of another country's officials." Pines, supra note 3, at
186. Though there is near unanimity on this point, a few sources cite a Swedish
law as similarly prohibiting bribery of foreign officials. See, e.g., Glenn A. Pit-
man & James P. Sanford, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Revisited: Attempt-
ing to Regulate "Ethical Bribes" in Global Business, INT'L J. PURCHASING &
MATERALs MGMr., Summer 1994, at 15, 19. It may be that the law to which
they refer is similar to, but not as strong as, the FCPA. This is perhaps not
surprising given the observation of a European writer, who comments, "[als
with any developments in international business practices, the U.S. tends to
lead the way, for better or for worse, and moral and ethical issues are no excep-
tion." Pat Lockett, Suddenly Ethics Is a Buzzword, THE HERAL (Glasgow),
Aug. 25, 1994, at 6.
35. Boylan, supra note 34, at 2017 n.119. "While all the OECD countries
have laws against domestic corruption... most industrialized countries allow
businessmen to deduct payoffs and kickbacks, commonly described as 'commis-
sions' or 'fees and promotional costs,' from their taxable income as a legitimate
foreign business expense." Id.
1997]
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tracked accurately.3 6 These provisions are intended to prevent
companies from maintaining the slush funds that enabled their
bribery to go unnoticed in the past.37 Though these provisions
apply only to reporting corporations, the fact that all such corpo-
rations must comply with them may not be obvious to those that
do no overseas trade.3 8
The bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit using any in-
strument of interstate commerce corruptly in the furtherance of
an offer or delivery of anything of value to a foreign official, polit-
ical party, or political candidate with the object of influencing
that person's official decisions. 39 Notably, they do not criminal-
ize what are generally called "grease" payments-those which
merely "[expedite] a business-related activity that a government
employee is already required to perform."40 These kinds of ac-
36. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1996). The most controversial aspect of
the accounting provisions is that "[d]espite the 'reasonableness' language, the
statute contains no 'materiality' standard; all expenditures are subject to the
accounting requirements, presumably on the ground that even a corrupt pay-
ment that is relatively small in absolute terms could jeopardize a far larger
contract or sales relationship." Gantz, supra note 8, at 178.
37. Gantz, supra note 8, at 177. "Congress wished to make it more difficult
for large corporations to conceal corrupt payments though 'slush funds' and
other questionable accounting categories." Id.
38. Hurd Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Jan/Feb. 1979, at 32. For instance, one unlikely application of the FCPA was
the SEC's investigation of television broadcaster ABC for payments it made to
producers Aaron Spelling and Leonard Goldberg. The SEC asserted that ABC
had not accounted for these payments in enough detail to dispel the appearance
of fraudulent double-billing by the producers. Jeff Gerth, ABC Is Under Inquiry
Over Millions in Fees to Two TV Producers, N.Y. TmEs, Aug. 17, 1980, at Al.
Though this case never resulted in any official action, the investigation illus-
trates the point that all firms obligated to report to the SEC must comply with
the FCPA's requirements.
39. FCPA §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a). Also included in the prohibition is a
transfer to a person acting as a conduit to a foreign official, political party, or
political candidate. Id.
40. Duncan, supra note 3, at 206. The applicable statutory provision is
contained in FCPA §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b).
A "grease" payment does not obtain or retain business.... The classic
example is paying $20 to a customs official to move the necessary pa-
pers before the banana shipment rots on the dock. Such payments are
allowed under the FCPA, even though this practice is illegal in the
United States and in many other foreign countries.
Duncan, supra note 3, at 206-07 (footnotes omitted). See also Deberardine,
supra note 7, at 224 (describing grease payments). "Unlike payments designed
to induce preferential treatment, the purpose of facilitating payments is to pro-
vide an incentive to low-level foreign officials to carry out their duties effi-
ciently. The payments do not result in these officials taking any new or
changed discretionary action." Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Pines, supra
note 3, at 203. "The 'routine actions' exemption [allowing grease payments]
666 [Vol. 6:657
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tivities can be performed without prejudice to any other busi-
ness desiring the same service, as opposed to a discretionary act
that favors one business to the detriment of others.41 Individu-
als convicted of violating these rules may receive up to five years
in jail, a $10,000 civil penalty, and a $100,000 fine;42 corpora-
tions are subject to civil penalties of $10,000 and fines of $2
million.43
The FCPA places enforcement power in both the SEC and
the Department of Justice (DoJ). The SEC may bring civil ac-
tions to enforce against (1) all violations of the accounting provi-
sions and (2) those violations of the bribery provisions
committed by reporting corporations." The DoJ has (1) author-
ity to bring all criminal charges plus (2) jurisdiction over civil
bribery suits against companies that are not reporting
corporations. 45
B. CRITICISM OF THE LAW
Soon after the FCPA became law, the business community
began to criticize it. 4s Companies disliked the split in enforce-
helps, but it doesn't tell you whether you can safely buy dinner for the minister,
or whether you can buy a snack in the cafeteria after a working session but not
dinner at a French restaurant." Id. (citing William E. Holland, Gift Rapping,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1981, at E3). According to a former U.S. attorney, exam-
ples of uncontroversial grease payments are small payments to speed customs
officials' clearance of goods or to expedite the connection of a transatlantic
phone call. John S. Estey & David W. Marston, Pitfalls (and Loopholes) in the
Foreign Bribery Law, FORTUNE, Oct. 9, 1978, at 182, 184.
41. Estey & Marston, supra note 40, at 184.
42. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78ff(c)(2) (1996).
43. FCPA 3H 78dd-2(g)(1), 78f0(c)(1). In an interesting proposed change to
the penalty provisions of the FCPA, a bribery fine would be calculated as a per-
centage of the amount of the bribe, since a set amount such as $2 million poses
a greater deterrent for a small firm than for a large one. John L. Graham, Don't
Dilute Law Curbing Bribery Overseas by American Companies, L.A. TImEs,
June 15, 1986, Part IV, at 3.
44. FCPA § 78flc).
45. FCPA § 78dd-2(g).
46. Pines, supra note 3, at 189. "The ink was hardly dry before a steady
drumbeat of attack on the statute began." Business Accounting and Foreign
Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on S. 708 Before the Subcomm. on Se-
curities and the Subcomm. on Int7 Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 414 (1981) (state-
ment of William A. Dobrovir) [hereinafter 1981 Hearings]. The FCPA was
passed in 1977 during the Carter presidency, but in 1981, the Reagan Adminis-
tration, in response to business interests, introduced a package of legislation
that would have substantially weakened the FCPA. George Lardner Jr., The
Assault on Watergate Reforms, WASH. PosT, July 5, 1981, at C1. The legislation
would also have diminished the applicability of the Ethics in Government Act of
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ment authority between the SEC and the DoJ, which meant
they had to predict how both agencies would view their overseas
activities. 47 In 1981, the DoJ instituted a program through
which a corporation could propose a course of action for the
DoJ's review and, if the DoJ approved of the action, obtain a pro-
spective judgment offering a rebuttable presumption that the ac-
tivity was legal under the FCPA.48 However, there was no
formal bar to the SEC bringing suit for the same conduct, and
although the SEC stated that it would not prosecute companies
for activities that the DoJ had approved, it reserved the right to
find an independent cause of action in the subject company's
acts.49 The publicity involved with disclosing internal informa-
tion to a government agency further deterred corporations from
taking advantage of the review program, 0 as did the possibility
of creating an aura of impropriety simply by inquiring about ap-
plication of the FCPA.51 The DoJ has shortened its response
time since the initiation of the program.52 Also, pursuant to
1988 amendments to the FCPA, 3 the DoJ has issued a report
1978, lightened restrictions on FBI and CIA surveillance activities, limited the
authority of the Federal Elections Commission, and reduced the effect of the
Freedom of Information Act. Id.
47. Duncan, supra note 3, at 203, 211.
48. Id. See also Adler, supra note 3, at 1755-58 (discussing procedure for
DoJ reviews).
49. Duncan, supra note 3, at 211. See also Adler, supra note 3, at 1757
(SEC retained ability to enforce accounting provisions). Pines explains that
... The original concept behind mutual enforcement was to have the
SEC initiate investigations, closely cooperate with the Justice Depart-
ment at the earliest stage of investigation, allow the SEC to bring in-
junctive relief for violations of securities law, and have the DoJ bring
criminal sanctions.
Unfortunately, this cozy interplay between the agencies has never
occurred ....
Pines, supra note 3, at 193 (footnote omitted).
50. Gantz, supra note 8, at 179. The Justice Department did express an
intention to use all available exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act to
keep proprietary data out of public circulation. Justice Dept. Setting Up Review
Process for Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 19, 1979, at 20.
51. Pines, supra note 3, at 204.
52. Gantz, supra note 8, at 179.
53. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
tit. V, sec. 13(b), sec. 30A, sec. 104(a), §§ 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25
(1988) [hereinafter Trade and Competitiveness Act]. The amendment process
was a long one. As early as 1981, Senator John Chafee proposed a bill which
would either clarify (as business claimed) or effectively repeal (as some public
policy analysts believed) the FCPA. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1759 (discussing
Chafee bill and arguments that it would clarify FCPA for business); Peter
Grier, U.S. Curb on Bribes: Too Prim Or Simply Proper?, CHRLsTLIN Sci. MoI-
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outlining "general explanations of compliance responsibilities
and potential liabilities under the FCPA."54 However, the fac-
tors that originally made businesses hesitant to request reviews
still exist, and the program is infrequently used.55
Another complaint was the increased difficulty and expense
of maintaining accounting standards that complied with the
FCPA's requirements. 56 The 1988 amendments to the FCPA did
not significantly relax its accounting requirements, but busi-
nesses seem to have adapted to keeping track of their finances
with the high degree of precision that the law requires.5 7
Further, companies were uncertain what acts would intro-
duce FCPA liability when performed by foreign nationals hired
to conduct business on behalf of U.S. corporations.5 8 The statute
originally held a corporation liable when it knew or had "reason
to know" about a bribe offered by one of its foreign agents.59 The
TOR, July 28, 1981, at 14 (citing commentary by original sponsor of FCPA that
proposed Amendments would destroy FCPA). The pro-business Reagan Admin-
istration supported the amendment but advocated even more extreme diminu-
tions to the law. Jeff Gerth, White House Seeks Eased Bribery Act, N.Y. TImEs,
May 21, 1981, at Al (Administration supported eliminating accounting provi-
sions altogether). After two failed attempts to amend the FCPA, Republicans
succeeded in attaching amendments to an omnibus trade act which, despite a
last-minute veto threat over an unrelated provision, became law in 1988. Trade
and Competitiveness Act §§ 5001-03; Levy, supra note 3, at 79 n.9 (describing
amendment process); Sherry R. Sontag, Is New Legislation Really Needed?
Bribery: A Close Call, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1988, at 1 (discussing veto threat).
54. Pines, supra note 3, at 192 n.43. Stanley Sporkin, head of enforcement
at the SEC when the FCPA was passed, opposed the issuance of such a docu-
ment, explaining that "[w]e don't have guidelines for rapists, muggers, and em-
bezzlers, and I don't think we need guidelines for corporations who want to
bribe foreign officials." White House Studies Changes in Bribery Law, NAT'L J.,
June 23, 1979, at 1053, 1054.
55. Holland, supra note 40, at E3 (stating that as of 1991, DoJ only receives
two or three requests for review each year).
56. Duncan, supra note 3, at 204-06.
An investigation by the General Accounting Office revealed that about
seventy-two percent of the corporations responding to its survey had
increased accounting and auditing costs by at least eleven percent be-
cause of the FCPA, and nearly a third of these companies reported in-
creases exceeding thirty-five percent. These costs stem from the severe
criminal penalties of the FCPA for accounting errors and control
weaknesses.
Id. at 205-06.
57. Morton Mintz, Hill Considers Changing Law on Foreign Bribery,
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1987, at H6 (citing Senate Banking Committee report in-
dicating that American corporations have generally complied with bookkeeping
and other provisions of the FCPA).
58. Duncan, supra note 3, at 208-09.
59. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, § 101, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). The criticism
went as follows:
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amendments of 1988 reworded the law to omit "reason to know,"
but provided that "knowledge is established if a person is aware
of a high probability" of an illegal act occurring, "unless the per-
son actually believes" that it is not.60 Now, the agency issue
seems clearer. Every corporation is on notice that it cannot, as
one compliance officer put it, "stick [its] head in the sand."6 '
As a more general criticism, businesses claimed that the
FCPA was written too ambiguously to offer notice of whether
particular activities were allowed or proscribed,62 deterring
[D]omestic concerns are liable for any corrupt political payments made
overseas, if the domestic concern knows or has reason to know of the
transaction.... Under the FCPA, a company and its directors and of-
ficers may be liable for an agent's actions that are more clearly visible
in hindsight than in foresight.
Duncan, supra note 3, at 208-09.
60. FCPA §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(b), 78dd-2(h)(3)(b). This amendment was a com-
promise between the preferences of businesses, which were hoping to avoid all
liability for the actions of their employees or agents, and the concerns of policy
makers, who worried that eliminating the reason-to-know provision entirely
would "[invite] a wide-open return to the knowing wink and the pregnant nod."
1981 Hearings, supra note 46, at 402 (testimony of Theodore Sorenson).
61. Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Do-
ing Business in Latin America: Adapting to a Changing Legal Environment, 9
FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 40 (1994) [hereinafter Conference Proceedings].
A United States company can be held liable for its foreign agent's ille-
gal payments, even if the company did not actually know of them;
knowledge is imputed if circumstances should reasonably have alerted
the company to the problem. Some of the circumstances considered to
be red flags are obvious, like an agent that demands an excessive com-
mission or payment in cash. Others are less so, like an agent that is
related to a government official or partial ownership of the agent's com-
pany by the family of a government official.
Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, United States-Latin Ameri-
can Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 111, 161 (1995) (footnotes
omitted). Gantz comments further on "red flags" that companies should recog-
nize as clues to ongoing bribery:
These may include, (1) activities in a region-for instance, the Middle
East--or with regard to products-aircraft, power plants, petroleum-
where problems have occurred in the past; (2) lack of knowledge as to
the reputation of a local agent; (3) requests for agent commissions sig-
nificantly larger than the norm; (4) requests that payments be made to
a foreign bank account or through fraudulent invoices, or in cash; (5)
refusal of the agent to acknowledge the applicability of the FCPA in
the contract; (6) a close relationship between the local agent and high
officials of the foreign government or its political parties; and (7) other
suspicious conduct that would raise questions in the eyes of a prudent
person.
Gantz, supra note 8, at 181.
62. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 207. "[Sleventy percent of the respon-
dents who reported that the FCPA caused a decrease in their overseas business
rated the clarity of at least one of the anti-bribery provisions as 'inadequate' or
'very inadequate.'" Id.
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them from participating in international markets.63 Provisions
criticized for ambiguity included corporate responsibility for acts
of foreign agents, and the probability of being prosecuted under
a scheme of dual enforcement, as discussed above. Companies
were also unsure of "the definition of the term 'foreign official'...
[and] whether a payment is a bribe, deemed illegal under the
FCPA, or a facilitating payment, legal under the FCPA."64
The distinction between bribes and grease payments was
particularly unclear because the original language of the FCPA
defined grease payments as those made to government officials
"whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical."65 It was
difficult for companies to identify these "ministerial" officials, 66
and it was unclear whether a particularly egregious payment
would nonetheless be legal by virtue of having been transmitted
to a fairly low-level official. 67 The 1988 amendments to the
FCPA changed the definition of a grease payment, characteriz-
ing it as one intended to "secure the performance of a routine
governmental action."68 This alteration seems to have satisfied
63. Bartley A. Brennan, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977: "Clarifying" or "Gutting' a Law?, 11 J. LnGis. 56, 62 (1984), construing
1981 Hearings, supra note 46. "[The] vagueness [of the definitions] has forced
American corporations to forego business opportunities abroad for fear of violat-
ing the FCPA and incurring its stiff criminal sanctions." Id. at 62-63. See also
James W. Singer, The Crackdown on Improper Corporate Payments Made
Abroad, NAT'L J., June 3, 1978, at 880 (discussing whether the FCPA was dis-
couraging American companies from engaging in international operations).
"Frank A. Weil, [Assistant [S]ecretary of Commerce for [1]ndustry and mrade,
said a number of businessmen have told him that they have abandoned their
export efforts in some countries where the risks are great and the potential
business is small." Id. Curiously, businesses seemed to worry in spite of evi-
dence that the DoJ and SEC would take action only against egregious viola-
tions: the DoJ itself noted that it had declined to prosecute cases where the
bribe was paid by a U.S. consultant in conjunction with a European firm, a
$13,000 bribe was considered to be too small to be worth prosecuting, or the
bribe was paid to a member of a country's royal family who was not clearly a
public official. Foreign Bribery Clarified, ENGINEERING NEws-REC., Sept. 15,
1983, at 24.
64. Levy, supra note 3, at 79.
65. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, § 101, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). See also Duncan,
supra note 3, at 207 (asserting that the statute's characterization of some offi-
cials as "ministerial" or "clerical" was ambiguous).
66. Adler, supra note 3, at 1766.
67. Id. at 1752. "[T]hese terms could include bribes to customs officials to
obtain lower-than-normal duties or bribes to license-granting authorities to ob-
tain import or export licenses or industrial property protection that is not al-
lowed by law." Id.
68. FCPA §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b). To illustrate, under this definition, "you
legally can pay a customs officer $25 in order to make sure he doesn't dally in
inspecting your shipment-a task he is supposed to perform anyway. But you
1997]
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those who criticized the grease payment exception in the statute
as originally written.69
Companies have continuing difficulty in discerning the
FCPA's mandate because there is little case law interpreting its
provisions, and therefore little guidance for a corporation trying
to determine whether a proposed course of action will comply
with the law.70 The scarcity of FCPA prosecutions seems to be
partly circumstantial and partly strategic. 71 It has been sug-
gested that the real utility of the FCPA lies in its deterrent
power rather than in its enforcement. 72
can't pay him to process your shipment without inspecting it at all." Ford S.
Worthy, When Somebody Wants a Payoff, FORTUNE, Fall 1989, at 117, 118.
69. But see Larry Lempert, FCPA Message Has Gotten Across, Prosecutor
Says, LEGAL Tnias, Sept. 20, 1982, at 5 (explaining that the head Justice De-
partment prosecutor of FCPA cases doubts that "routine governmental action"
is any clearer than "ministerial or clerical"). A collateral observation on the
grease payment exception is that, contrary to most accounting rules, there is no
materiality requirement for the reporting of bribes, which means that any
bribe, no matter how small, can be the basis for liability. Gartz, supra note 8, at
178. Businesses sometimes object to this as unnecessarily stringent. See
Lardner, supra note 46, at C1 (costs of accounting "in reasonable detail" said to
be too high by Reagan-era U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock, sup-
porting bill that would have introduced a materiality requirement). As a practi-
cal matter, neither the SEC nor the DoJ is likely to prosecute a company for
making a bribe in an inconsequential amount. See Foreign Bribery Clarified,
supra note 63, at 24. But the use of a materiality test (such as comparing the
size of a bribe to a company's revenues) would result in some highly egregious
bribes going unreported when made by large companies. For instance, a com-
pany with annual revenues of $50 million (not an uncommon figure) could most
likely give a corrupt foreign official a Ferrari without the expense of the car
being material by usual accounting standards.
70. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1749. "Since there is practically no interpre-
tive case law or regulatory history under the Act, there is much confusion as to
whether the anti-bribery provisions of the Act apply to certain commercial
transactions." Id. (footnote omitted). "Despite several prominent cases, en-
forcement of the FCPA's antibribery provision has been extremely limited.
From 1977 to 1988, the DoJ initiated only twenty antibribery cases under the
FCPA, and the SEC only three." Pines, supra note 3, at 192 (footnotes
omitted).
71. Factors which make it difficult for the government to compile the evi-
dence necessary to bring an FCPA case include the likelihood the evidence will
be in a foreign country and the possibility that any evidence discovered may
only be available from corporate employees whose testimony will be protected
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Adler, supra note 3, at 1755. Further-
more, "any attempted prosecution, whether or not successful, may cause Ameri-
can companies to lose business or may damage United States foreign relations."
Id.
72. One writer noted, however, that at least as of the end of 1981, FCPA
cases invariably included other charges for the same conduct, suggesting that
perhaps there was no need to have such a law. John F.X Peloso, The Foreign
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Many businesses assert that even though they seek to obey
the law, compliance is difficult in countries where corrupt prac-
tices are standard. 73 Their foreign agents may not accept the
elimination of bribery as a means of doing business, or local offi-
cials may resist the corporation's insistence that it is legally pro-
hibited from fulfilling bribe requests. In the real world of
business, the incentive to work outside the strictures of the
FCPA is great; as one businessman explained, "[dlo you have
any idea what it is like in Saudi Arabia?... you don't sell any-
thing unless there is someone getting it one way or the other....
[The FCPAI is the stupidest [expletive deleted] law I've seen in
my life."
74
Yet another criticism of the FCPA is that it fails to respect
the moral codes of cultures in which bribery is an accepted part
of the social order. 75 Some observers maintain that to require
American businesses to adhere to the FCPA in their overseas
operations is to "export our morality."76 Those who disagree
with this position reject the concept of bribery as a cultural tra-
dition since "[n]o commentator on the FCPA has yet pointed to a
nation that has legislation that expressly condones the bribery
of government officials."77 Proponents of this view also argue
Corrupt Practices Act: A Survey of the SEC's Enforcement Program, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1981, at 18, 20.
73. Curtiss & Atkinson, supra note 61, at 160 (suggesting that this may be
particularly true with regard to business dealings in Latin America, "because
some practices common to establishing and conducting business there-such as
using local consultants to thread through local bureaucracies, or dealing with
the government during privatization-can create FCPA liability if not handled
properly").
74. Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1509-10
(1984).
75. Pines, supra note 3, at 204-07 (discussing the contention that "the
FCPA is an offensive display of moral imperialism"). The Eastern European
saying, "[t]he person who does not steal from the state steals from his family,"
suggests that there may indeed be cultures where bribery is more likely to be
an accepted part of trade. Gregory L. Miles, Crime, Corruption, and Multina-
tional Business, INT'L Bus., July 1995, at 34, 43.
76. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 7, at 32-33 (quoting The Activities of Ameri-
can Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int7
Econ. Policy of the House Comm. on Int7 Relations, 94th Cong., 24 (1975) (state-
ment of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department)).
77. Pines, supra note 3, at 205. The author adds that, "[i]n fact, if any
nation is found expressly to allow bribery of its government officials, or changes
its laws to so allow, the FCPA, by its very terms, will no longer apply to transac-
tions occurring within that nation." Id. at 205 n.133. This is interesting be-
cause it illustrates what seems to be a lack of good information. The pro-
business FCPA reform advocates wrote into the 1988 amendments that if a pay-
ment was legal in the country where made, it would not violate the FCPA, ap-
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that countries often welcome the elimination of a corrupt rela-
tionship between business and government, 78 as traumatic as
the exposure of that relationship may be.79
Many commentators believe that the FCPA has reduced
U.S. companies' international competitiveness and criticize it on
that basis,80 but this point is vigorously disputed.81 Some con-
parently believing that this would insulate many transactions from being
labeled bribes. FCPA §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1). Writers such as Pines insist
that this provision has no effect because there are no countries that officially
permit bribery of their government officials. Pines, supra note 3, at 205. The
difference may possibly be that the anti-FCPA movement thought it was saying
that U.S. firms could make bribes in any country which allowed its own compa-
nies to make bribes when out of the country, and the FCPA preservationists
assume the provision means that bribes are only allowable in countries that do
not make it a crime to bribe their own officials. The language is ambiguous and
there is no case law interpreting it.
78. Pines, supra note 3, at 206.
[I]n the Middle East, a region renowned for its alleged corruption, the
"host-country response to most cases [brought under the FCPA] was
minimal with no immediate or clear destabilizing effect to the Middle
Eastern regime involved." Furthermore, far from being damaging to
the nation involved, such revelations are sometimes met with varying
degrees of support.
Id. (quoting Kate Gillespie, Middle East Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 29 CAL. MGmTr. REv. 9, 12 (1987)).
79. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Boylan, supra note 34, at 2016 (asserting that "because the
United States acted alone in attempting to curtail corrupt practices abroad, the
Act placed U.S. businesses operating abroad at a severe competitive disadvan-
tage"); Gene Koretz, Bribes Can Cost the U.S. an Edge, Bus. WIK, Apr. 15, 1996,
at 30 ("U.S. corporate direct investment and exports declined markedly in 'cor-
rupt' countries in the five years after the [FCPA] was passed. By contrast, in-
vestment and export activity in the same countries by America's foreign
competitors accelerated sharply.").
81. See, e.g., Pines, supra note 3, at 208.
While some businesses complain about the harmful effects of the FCPA
on American business abroad, no study confirms the validity of these
claims. The only surveys which support the complaints are polls of the
business community's perceptions of the Act's negative effects. More
objective studies reveal that the FCPA has had no perceptible effect on
U.S. international business.
Id. (emphasis in original). "mhe claim that U.S. companies have lost exports
because of the FCPA is often made and never substantiated. There is much
evidence against it." 1981 Hearings, supra note 46, at 414 (statement of Wil-
liam A. Dobrovir). See also Robert M. Jarvis, Adrift at Sea: The Muddled Rela-
tionship between Civil RICO and Maritime Law, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 111, 128
(1987).
At its inception, the FCPA was roundly decried as a millstone around
the neck of American industry that would make it impossible for Amer-
ican industry to compete with foreign industry. In more recent times,
however, as cooler heads have prevailed and the perpetual doomsayers
have been pushed off to one side, the FCPA has come to be viewed in a
favorable light and has been recognized as actually helping American
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M LTILATERALIrZATION OF THE FCPA
cede that the FCPA creates losses at the level of the individual
corporation, but counter with the assertion that non-economic
benefits outweigh the cost of compliance. For instance, a law
preventing companies from entering corrupt relationships also
keeps them from becoming permanently entangled in local poli-
tics.8 2 It also eliminates the expense of bribe payments, which
are an inefficient use of money since their effect can never be
certain.83 Many writers believe that forced compliance with the
FCPA has made American companies stronger competitors on
the merits of their businesses, which serves them well when
they compete in non-corrupt environments.84 Notwithstanding
businesses by sprucing up the international image of American
businessmen.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Singer, supra note 63, at 881 (citing a study that
showed no harm to trade).
82. Pines, supra note 3, at 210. "Most corporations, frankly, are happy to
have an excuse not to become entangled with shady practices overseas." Id.
(quoting When in Rome, MNCs Don't Always Do as the Romans, Bus. INT'L, July
16, 1990). See also Conference Proceedings, supra note 61, at 53, in which an
executive states, "I view the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a benefit to U.S.
companies, because we do business on the up and up. You compete on quality."
Another executive comments that
[y]ou can avoid such problems if you are persistent and you go in the
first time it happens and talk to the people face to face. If a business-
man does this, he will not have problems in the future. If he pays the
first time he will pay forever.
There are people who do business cleanly and there are people who
do business dirty. I expect most international business is done both of
these ways in every country. You can choose which of the two you
want to do and that is your choice.
Id. at 54.
83. Pines, supra note 3, at 211. As the author explains,
[biribery can prove exceedingly expensive, but yield no results. It is
often difficult to know whom to bribe or how much to pay. Bribes often
include payments made through intermediaries to unknown connected
parties. In fact, payments may not be passed on to the "connected"
party, or the connected party may not even exist. Finally, even if the
payment is sufficient and goes to the right person, that person may not
award the contract to the bribing corporation, possibly because another
corporation has provided an even greater bribe!
Id.
84. See On the Take, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988, at 21, 22. One example is
a U.S. businessman who distributes workplace safety products in Ecuador and
says that, in lieu of bribing, he has achieved success "by carrying more stock
than his competitors, by training employees heavily on the use of products and
by doing repairs." Cristina Rouvalis, The Ecuadorean Connection, PrrTSBURGH
PosT-GAzE'rr, Jan. 8, 1995, at El, E2. A corporate official at'the European
firm, Airbus, complains about the inaccuracy of the assumption that "[e]ach
time we win a deal, it's because of dirty tricks.... [whereas e]ach time Boeing
wins, it's because of a better product." Amy Borrus, A World of Greased Palms,
Bus. WK., Nov. 6, 1995, at 36.
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these benefits, the FCPA was not enacted to invigorate trade but
to recognize a moral principle. As a Justice Department official
put it, "[clompliance with the new Act may not be costless for the
United States. But living up to one's principles rarely is."8 5
Finally, critics believed that the FCPA could not, as a uni-
lateral measure, be effective in combating bribery-only a multi-
lateral solution could have any significant impact.86 The 1988
amendments to the FCPA addressed this concern by mandating
that the President work though the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to promote the enact-
ment of similar laws in OECD member countries.8 7 Other provi-
sions of the 1988 amendments may have increased the
likelihood that other countries will develop laws patterned on
the FCPA.88
C. MULTILATERALIZATION ATTEMPTs
As noted above, the 1988 amendments to the FCPA require
the President to pursue international accord on the criminaliza-
tion of foreign bribery.8 9 Efforts to curtail the international sup-
ply of bribe money, which flows chiefly from developed to
developing countries, are not new. While the United States
worked on enacting the FCPA, a movement arose in the United
Nations to establish a worldwide bribery ban.90 Three years
later, there had been no success and the effort was abandoned. 91
After the failure of these initiatives, the G-7 took up the matter,
again with no concrete results. 92 In 1977, the International
Chamber of Commerce began to promote an anti-bribery code of
behavior for its member companies. 93 Though well-received,
this code applied only to the businesses that chose to adopt it,
85. Philip B. Heymann, Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting Viola-
tions of For. Corrupt Practices Act, Am. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1979, 4, 10.
86. Duncan, supra note 3, at 221.
87. Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, sec. 13(b),
sec. 30A, sec. 104(a), §§ 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1424 (1988). See also Pines,
supra note 3, at 191 (describing the provision).
88. Duncan, supra note 3, at 221-22.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. Catherine Yannaca-Small, Battling International Bribery, OECD OB-
SERVER, FeblMar. 1995, at 16 [hereinafter OECD OBSERVER]; see also G.A. Res.
3514, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 69, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976)
(U.N. initiative described by Yannaca-Small).
91. Rosie Waterhouse, A Slap on the Backhanders, THE INDEPENDENT, May
24, 1994, at 16.
92. Robert Pear, Corporate Practices Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1981, at
20 (Int'l Econ. Survey).
93. OECD OBSERVER, supra note 90, at 16.
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not to governments, 94 and was thus incapable of the kind of
sweeping policy change that an international compact could
have effected.
In the past few years, the Clinton Administration's advo-
cacy of anti-corruption initiatives has reinvigorated interna-
tional resolve to work against bribery. The Administration has
even been been able to induce several groups of nations to pledge
not to tolerate foreign bribery by their businesses. 95 It has yet
to be seen whether these pledges will develop into law, and
whether these laws will be enforced.
In 1994, the OECD adopted a renewed anti-bribery stance,
which it said represented "a commitment to effective measures
based upon agreement that corruption is both harmful to fair
competition and to the political process."96 In April 1996, it com-
mitted each of its members to disallowing tax deductions for
bribe payments,97 a measure which the United States sees as
positive but only a first step toward criminalizing bribery alto-
gether. 98 A working group of the OECD is also constructing a set
of guiding principles by which each member state can enact its
own law against foreign bribery, a task it is scheduled to com-
plete by May 1997. 99
The United States is also attempting to work through the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Japan, the European Union,
Canada, and the U.S. proposed a transparency agreement to the
December 1996 Singapore Ministerial, 100 but were only able to
secure an agreement for the ministers to study the issue.10 1
This compromise was necessitated by the opposition of a group
of countries that did not see corruption as a trade issue and
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
96. Boylan, supra note 34, at 2017; see also Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Council Recommendation on Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, 33 IL.M. 1389 (1994).
97. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Council Rec-
ommendation C(96)271Final on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Pub-
lic Officials, 35 LL.M. 1311-12 (1996). See also Remarks of Secretary of
Commerce Michael Kantor, FDCH FED. DEPr. AND AGENCY DOCUMENTS, July
25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
98. Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business
Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10 (citing commentary of American
diplomats).
99. Kantor, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 18,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997).
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feared that a multilateral agreement would limit state
sovereignty. 102
III. A BETTER APPROACH
It may be too early to measure the effectiveness of the reso-
lutions discussed above. At the very least, they bring public at-
tention to the issue of corruption, which thrives in secrecy.
Unfortunately, an agreement to act is not itself action, 10 3 and
there has been no concrete progress to date. Some reports indi-
cate that Sweden has banned its businesses from making
bribes, 10 4 but the U.S. Department of Commerce maintains that
the U.S. is still the only country with such a law,'0 5 in spite of
the initiatives discussed above. 10 6
It appears, then, that even the diplomatic concessions re-
cently won through arduous and protracted negotiations may
102. Sleepless in Singapore, WASH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1996, at C6.
103. Murphy, supra note 1, at 396. "[Slimply because most member coun-
tries agree in principle that bribery should be prohibited does not lead to the
conclusion that a meaningful agreement can be drafted." Id.
104. Gail Russell Chaddock, More Trade Brings Graft to Light--and to
Trial, CHRISTLAN Sci. MONrTOR, Jan. 10, 1996, at 1; Deepak Gopinath, Rules of
the Game, INFRAsmucruRE FIN., Oct. 1996, at 49.
105. Daniel B. Moskowitz, Picking Up the Tab, INTrL Bus., Nov. 1995, at 67
(citing comments by Charlene Barshefsky, then deputy United States Trade
Representative).
106. Canada is an example. It has joined several multinational pacts to end
foreign bribery, but in practice tolerates bribery as it has always done. Ethics
Lose Their Glitter: Tactics of Two Canadian Companies Seeking to Develop an
Indonesian Gold Find Sparks Business Ethics Debate, OTTAWA CIIZEN, Dec. 27,
1996 ("Canada has agreed in principle, through a number of international orga-
nizations, to support actions to criminalize foreign corrupt business practices.
In practice, Canada pointedly looks the other way"). See also Ethical Minefield:
Projects in Corrupt Countries Raise Dilemmas for Canadians, VANcoUVER SUN,
Nov. 7, 1996, which states:
Canada is party to a 1994 agreement in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation & Development that calls on member countries to "take
effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign
public officials in connection with international business transactions."
Canada also agreed this year to an OECD ministers' resolution "to
criminalize such bribery in an effective and coordinated manner." This
spring, Canada supported the Organization of American States Inter-
American Convention against Corruption. And, for good measure, the
Ontario Securities Commission [OSC] in June adopted an interna-
tional resolution to outlaw "illicit payments made by public compa-
nies." Do any of these fine words mean that the Canadian government,
or the OSC, will investigate just what Bre-X Minerals Ltd. [a gold min-
ing venture accused of bribing Indonesian officials] is up to in Indone-
sia? Of course not.
The article goes on to conclude that "[i]t is past time that Canada's laws on
bribery abroad matched its fine rhetoric." Id.
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not yield real reductions in bribery. It is politically expedient for
a country to profess an interest in the movement against inter-
national bribery; enforcement of anti-bribery measures, which
threaten the country's balance of trade, may be less attractive.
Although the OECD and WTO initiatives do represent progress,
perhaps the U.S. should look elsewhere for ways of effecting
meaningful changes in the transparency of world business
transactions.
One promising alternative method of reducing corruption is
for the U.S. government to work with developing countries that
are trying to stamp out bribery on their own. U.S. efforts up to
this time can be characterized as taking a "supply-side" ap-
proach, in that American diplomats have attempted to persuade
other industrialized countries to stop their businesses from sup-
plying bribes to officials of less-developed countries. In contrast
to the United States' multilateralization attempts, which con-
centrate on the flow of bribes from developed countries, a "de-
mand-side" approach would provide support for antibribery
campaigns in developing countries. By helping these countries
discover strategies that will keep their officials from accepting
bribes, the U.S. can lessen the demand for these corrupt pay-
ments. By this method, the U.S. can reduce the number of
bribes that change hands without having to continue to work
through the administrative morass of international organiza-
tions representing countries with diverse interests. The U.S.
can work with each "demand" country according to its own cir-
cumstances, helping it to develop an appropriate response to
bribery as it occurs within that country's governmental
structure.
Conveniently, the time is ripe for the rollout of a demand-
side strategy. Developing countries around the world are wak-
ing up to the reality that corruption has significant hidden costs.
Bribery increases the cost and decreases the quality of public
works projects; it misdirects public money away from needed
projects toward ones that have the potential to yield bribes; and
it breeds an attitude of self-interest rather than public interest
among government officials.' 0 7 Less-developed countries are
particularly unable to afford this kind of inefficiency, and they
are responding with resolve to aggressively address the bribery
of their own government officials.' 08
107. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
108. In the words of one foreign businessman:
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Reports of anticorruption campaigns in less-developed coun-
tries have appeared with increasing frequency in recent
months-evidence of the vigor with which these countries are
fighting back against bribery. Perhaps the best example is Ec-
uador, which has historically been known as severely corrupted
but is now working with Transparency International' 0 9 in a pro-
gram to establish itself as an "island of integrity" whose model
other countries can follow.1 0 Even Russia, where corruption is
.. when we tolerate these "commissions" as normal business transac-
tions, we are sending our younger generation the message that hard
work and creative efforts will get them nowhere, and that the best way
to make it is to make it crooked-hardly the kind of message that great
nations are made of.
Jihad Al-Khazen, Good Morning: Honesty Meeting, MONEYCLIPS, Feb. 14, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Transparency International, a
global nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting efforts to end corruption
in international business, argues that reform campaigns are "driven not by de-
veloped nations, but by the desire of a generation of Third World leaders who
see that their political progress and their economies are being destroyed by cor-
ruption." Stevie Cameron, Dreaming of a World Without Corruption,
MACLFAN'S, Apr. 8, 1996, at 36. The group attributes the timing of these move-
ments to the "opening up of more and more countries to multiparty politics,
coupled with greater press freedom and efforts by public prosecutors."
Gopinath, supra note 104. Even an agreement such as the OAS is grounded in
the desire to preserve democracy and economic growth.
Enforcement of these principles [in the OAS agreement] would be a
major shift in countries such as Mexico and Colombia, where allega-
tions of corruption have reached the highest levels of government....
[One U.S. official states,] "I'm not imagining that everyone at every
level of, say, the Mexican government has seen the light and taken the
pledge." But the Latin governments are serious about turning over a
new leaf because "so many of them in this hemisphere are democratic
now, and it is democratic governments that are being undermined by
people's lack of confidence in them. If you're a military dictatorship,
you don't care about that."
Thomas W. Lippman, After 20-Year Campaign, U.S. Balks at OAS Pact Against
Business Corruption, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1996, at All.
109. Transparency International is an organization with chapters in over
sixty countries devoted to decreasing the prevalence of international bribery.
Barbara Ettorre, Why Overseas Bribery Won't Last, MGmT. REV., June 1994, at
20, 23. Its approach is collegial rather than confrontational; it intervenes only
when its assistance is solicited. Id, The group was founded by a former World
Bank executive who resigned in frustration at seeing international aid funds
diverted to pay off corrupt officials when it was intended to assist underdevel-
oped countries. Raymond Bonner, The Worldly Business of Bribery: Quiet Bat-
tle is Joined, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1996, at A3.
110. Ettorre, supra note 109, at 24. As part of this program, Ecuador's En-
ergy Ministry recently began requiring each of its clients to sign an agreement
not to offer bribes. Christina Katsouris, Ecuadorean Energy Minister, Company
Chief Plan to Clean House in Scandal-Ridden Sector, OIL DAImy, Jan. 16, 1996,
at 2. It was motivated by an episode in which an Ecuadorean transportation
official accepted a bribe to contract with a firm to supply locomotives that were
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becoming legendary,"' was among the sponsors of the U.N. res-
olution against foreign bribery, which a U.S. official attributes to
"a growing awareness of the economic toll which corruption
takes on a nation's economy." 112 Many other less-developed
countries have already begun to crack down on corruption, and
the list continues to grow."13
Two recent international compacts also show that develop-
ing countries are committed to working against corruption. In
March of 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS)"14
passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution requiring the 21 signatory
too heavy to run on the country's railroad tracks. Valeria Merino Dirani, Build-
ing Islands of Integrity-The Ecuador Model after One Year, TI NEWSL., Mar.
1995, at 3-4. The program is hailed as a major success. Id.
111. See, e.g., Agniezka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 131-33. (1996).
112. UN Assembly /Bribery: Meant to Eliminate Trade Hurdle, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS SERv., Dec. 16, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 12/16/96 DJINS
17:39:00 [hereinafter UN Resolution].
113. South Korea, Guatemala, Argentina, and Romania have begun to crack
down on corruption. Pines, supra note 3, at 212. The campaign in Argentina is
being led by local lawyers tired of seeing corrupt officials enriched with public
money. Michael Elliott, Corruption, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 42. In South
Korea, "two former presidents and several corporate chieftains face corruption
charges connected with a political slush fund that may have reached $1 billion."
Chaddock, supra note 104.
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela have also
begun to address the problem of corruption. Powers, supra note 103, at 12.
Corruption reform was a major theme in Mexico's 1993-94 elections. Michael
Skol, Out From Under the Table: Governments Forge Ahead with Anti-Corrup-
tion Efforts, Bus. MExIco, Feb. 1996, at 24. The recent ouster of a Venezuelan
president is attributed to "a sea change of opinion against questionable busi-
ness practices." Gopinath, supra note 104. This movement has been led by in-
vestigative journalists. Elliott, supra, at 42.
The Philippines, Cambodia, Hungary, Pakistan, El Salvador, Tanzania,
Thailand, and Zimbabwe are also addressing the problem of corruption. UN
Resolution, supra note 112; Robert S. Leiken, An End to Corruption, WASH.
POST, Apr. 16, 1996, at A15.
China is also taking steps to curb corruption. Another correspondent re-
ports that "China's nearly two-year corruption drive has resulted in the death
penalty for some lower-level municipal officials and last year toppled the party
secretary of Beijing." Chaddock, supra note 104, at 7. Peter Eigen, head of
Transparency International, has been quoted as saying that the Chinese exe-
cuted 150 people in 1994 for corruption. Susan Lina, Corruption: Can It Be
Stamped Out?, SiNGAPORE STRArrs TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at 1. It is reported that
"unhappiness about corruption is running so strongly, both within the [Commu-
nist] party and in the public at large, that China's leaders have no alternative
but to continue." Charles A. Radin, China Roots Out Corruption On High, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1995, at 8.
114. The OAS is comprised of the U.S., Mexico, Canada, and countries in
Latin America, South America, and the Caribbean. N.J. Renegger & John
Campbell, TREATIES AND ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD, 6th ed. 1995, at 288.
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countries to outlaw bribery. 115 This agreement is entitled the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and is particu-
larly noteworthy because many of the countries involved have
historically been known for unacceptable levels of corruption. 116
In November 1996, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council urged the 185 member states of the U.N. to criminalize
foreign bribery and eliminate the tax-deductibility of bribe pay-
ments;1 7 the General Assembly ratified this declaration in De-
cember."l 8 Although past attempts to address bribery through
the U.N. have progressed slowly and eventually been aban-
doned, 1 9 the mere fact that this initiative has met with accept-
ance is a positive sign that the constituents of the United
Nations-many of them less-developed countries-have come to
agree that they must take action against bribery..
U.S. assistance to developing nations' clean-up efforts could
take many forms. Perhaps the simplest would be for the U.S.
government to make sure Transparency International has all
the resources it needs to continue its successful intervention tac-
tics. 120 U.S. foreign aid might incorporate advice aimed at
building the administration skills of developing countries' gov-
ernments, such as large-scale accounting and project manage-
ment programs. 121 In the end, however, corrupt countries
115. Organization of American States, INTER-AMEmCAN CONVENTION
AGAiNST CoRnuPTIoN, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Assembly Acts on Financing of Six Peace-Keeping Operations, Adopts
10 Texts on Recommendation of Legal Committee, FED. NEWs SERv., Dec. 17,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. "[Tihe Assembly
adopted the United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in In-
ternational Commercial Transactions, by which States pledged to deny the tax
deductibility of bribes paid by any private or public corporation or individual of
a Member State to any public official or elected representative of another coun-
try. Also under the Declaration, States pledged to criminalize bribery of foreign
officials in an effective and coordinated manner." Id.
119. Business Bribes: On the Take, THE ECONoMISr, Nov. 19, 1988, at 21.
120. It should be noted that the United States and several American firms
already provide a generous amount of backing for Transparency International.
Removing Obstacles to Exporting, Bus. Am., Oct. 1994, at 30.
121. This offer would have to be carefully crafted to avoid policy conflicts or
accusations of trying to influence the domestic politics of other countries. Rob-
ert Leiken, a respected corruption researcher, suggests other components of a
possible transparency package: "laws protecting whistle-blowers and penaliz-
ing illicit enrichment, financial disclosure, mandatory reporting of bribe offers,
strong enforcement mechanisms, management information systems and public-
private partnerships." Joint Hearing of the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control & the Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on Interna-
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themselves are in the best position to describe what aid they
need in order to eliminate corruption.
In addition, there may be ways for corporations to partici-
pate in the drive to eliminate foreign bribery. Obviously, they
must comply with the letter and spirit of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. They can support Transparency International, as
some U.S. businesses already do. Finally, they should be en-
couraged to report incidents of bribe-seeking to the State De-
partment or other appropriate governmental agency. 122
Independent initiatives by historically corrupt countries
may quickly accomplish more than have the years of work by the
United States to persuade other "supply" countries to change
their ways. By lending support to antibribery drives such as
these, the United States can not only accomplish its original
goal of leveling the playing field for American businesses, but
can also contribute to transparency, democracy, and open mar-
kets in countries in which it does business. The present Admin-
istration already recognizes the need for a demand-side
component to its crusade against foreign bribery. 123 The success
of programs already underway in developing countries indicates
that more of the United States' focus should be directed toward
curbing the demand for-rather than the supply of-bribes.
CONCLUSION
Although many assert that the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act has practical and philosophical flaws, few dispute that it em-
bodies a noble goal-the reduction of bribery and its negative
ramifications. There is a consensus that, toward this end, it
would be beneficial for the nations of the world to adopt a uni-
tional Crime, FED. Doc. CLEARING HousE CONG. TwSTnmoNY, July 30, 1996 (tes-
timony of Robert S. Leiken), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
122. The State Department already handles CIA reports of foreign corpora-
tions offering bribes to decision makers where U.S. firms may be disadvantaged
by obeying the FCPA. Remarks by CIA Director James Woolsey to the American
Bar Association, FED. NEws SERV., April 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
123. Moskowitz, supra note 105, at 67.
Washington hopes to get the major industrial nations to make it un-
lawful for their manufacturers to pay bribes for contracts and hopes to
get less-developed countries-where the bribe-taking seems concen-
trated-to move to more transparent purchasing policies so that it will
be evident to everyone what the criteria is [sic] for picking a supplier
and how the winner stacked up against other bidders.
1997] 683
684 MNw. J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 6:657
form stance with respect to this form of corruption. The diffi-
culty has been in achieving such multilateralization.
The United States is to be commended for its efforts to elim-
inate bribery by persuading other developed nations to forbid
their businesses from engaging in the practice. However, it may
be more efficient for the U.S. to devote its energies to bolstering
the anti-bribery efforts of countries whose officials have histori-
cally been the recipients of bribes. Supply-side negotiations
have been going on for years and are, even now, barely yielding
any international action. Meanwhile, developing nations have
begun to mount their own campaigns against corruption. These
efforts to quash the demand for bribes offer an excellent alterna-
tive to a continued struggle for multinational accord.
